In a precedent-setting decision for the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals recently held that an employer may violate Title VII by taking action against an employee for their association with an individual of another race. Holcomb v. Iona College, No. 06-3815-CV, 2008 WL 852129 (2d Cir. April 1, 2008). The Court rejected the restrictive interpretation taken by a few other Circuits that have found the language “because of such individual’s race” to bar a cause of action under such circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Instead, the Second Circuit adopted the more expansive interpretation of the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, finding that indeed “where an employee is subject to adverse action because…of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the employee’s own race.” Holcomb 2008 WL 852129 at *9 (emphasis in original).
Holcomb, a white basketball coach hired by Iona College in 1995, claimed he was terminated in 2004 because of his marriage to a black woman in 2001. In support of his claim, Holcomb alleged that on a number of occasions the director of athletics for the college, Shawn Brennan, and Iona vice president, Richard Petriccione, made racist comments regarding African Americans in general and also specifically about his marriage (once allegedly stating, “[Y]ou’re really going to marry that Aunt Jemima?”). Holcomb further claimed Brennan and Petriccione acted discriminatorily to keep African-Americans away from post-game events. The college, on the other hand, asserted Holcomb’s termination was entirely unrelated to race. Rather, because the basketball team had a losing record between 2001 and 2004, the college needed to make administrative changes and cuts. Because the head coach had a contract worth more than $300,000 a year, the college claimed terminating him would have been a costly maneuver. It was also impossible to terminate the whole coaching staff, but Holcomb and another employee (who was African American), were the least costly possibilities. Additionally, the college maintained that Brennan and Petriccione did not influence the termination decision (although in actuality, as a vice president, Petriccione had been involved in the decision).
The college moved for, and was granted, summary judgment by the district court. The lower Court found that no reasonable jury could find in favor of Holcomb, and it agreed that even if Petriccione and Brennan had engaged in discriminatory conduct, Holcomb did not establish facts linking the conduct to the administration’s evaluation of the basketball program. Holcomb v. Iona College, No. 05 Civ. 0848 CM, 2006 WL 1982764 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2006).
The Second Circuit vacated this decision and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with their findings. First, mentioned above, the Court held a cause of action exists for associational race discrimination. Had Holcomb been black, his marriage would not have been interracial; thus, inherent in the claim is discrimination based on one’s own race. See also, Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated in part on other grounds by Williams v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment premised on an interracial relationship.”); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his race.”).
Second, the Court found that Holcomb produce sufficient evidence of racial animus during his employment to have a jury decide whether his termination was motivated by race. In particular, the Court found influential in establishing a prima facie case the fact that Plaintiff, who was married to a black woman, and another coach who was black were the only two coaches terminated. Moreover, Petrriccione’s insults to Holcomb in public were also influential. The Court then observed the college had proffered a racially neutral reason for Holcomb’s termination. Nonetheless, because Holcomb was arguing mixed motive, i.e. race was motivating factor but not the only factor in the decision to terminate, he was not required to prove that the college’s stated reason was pretextual. Holcomb v. Iona College, 2008 WL 852129 at *11. Although the Court noted the existence of a limited affirmative defense, i.e., the same decision would have been made regardless of the discriminating motive, the Court concluded that here, the evidence presented by Holcomb was sufficient to suggest that improper purposes at least played a partial role in the termination decision. Thus, summary judgment was improper and the ultimate determination of impropriety and illegality should be decided by a jury.
This decision is particularly important because it concerns circumstances occurring not only in the workplace but outside as well - an employee’s personal association now can influence conduct within the workplace. Although courts have generally found that association with a party engaging in a protected activity can give rise to a retaliation claim, this decision opens the realm of possibilities for discrimination cases as well.
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