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The Court of Appeal, Fifth District, affirmed an order of the Los Angeles County Superior Court granting summary judgment to the Administrator of the insured's estate. The trial court and Court of Appeal concluded the Administrator had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary feloniously and intentionally killed the insured. The beneficiary was therefore disqualified from receiving payment of life insurance proceeds under California's Slayer Statutes (Cal. Probate Code sections 250-254), despite the fact that his criminal conviction was under appeal.
In 2001 Principal Life Insurance Company ("Principal") issued a variable universal life insurance policy, in the face amount of $250,000. Laci Peterson was the insured on the policy and her husband, Scott Peterson ("Peterson"), was the beneficiary. On November 12, 2004, a jury found Peterson guilty of the first degree murder of Laci Peterson. On March 16, 2005, the court entered a commitment judgment of death against Peterson. Peterson appealed and his appeal is currently pending before the California Supreme Court.
Peterson and the Administrator of Laci Peterson's estate (the "Administrator") submitted competing claims for the policy proceeds. Principal therefore filed an interpleader action, naming Peterson and the Administrator as defendants. Principal, Peterson and the Administrator stipulated to an order permitting Principal to deposit the policy proceeds with the court, discharging Principal from further liability and dismissing it from the action.
After Peterson's conviction, the Administrator filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion she asked the court to take judicial notice of Peterson's conviction. The court did so, without objection from Peterson. However, Peterson opposed the motion, contending the evidence of his criminal conviction alone was insufficient to discharge the Administrator's burden of proof. Peterson's only evidence in opposition to the motion was a declaration from his attorney, stating his murder conviction was on appeal.
The trial court granted the Administrator's motion. It concluded the Administrator had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Peterson feloniously and intentionally murdered his wife. Peterson appealed.
On appeal the Administrator argued Peterson's murder conviction was sufficient to meet the requirements of Probate Code section 254, subsection (a). This statute provides that a "final judgment of conviction of felonious and intentional killing" is sufficient to disqualify a beneficiary from any policy benefits under Probate Code section 252.
The Court disagreed. It concluded the term "final judgment of conviction" in this statute was ambiguous. The Court therefore examined the statute's legislative history along with judicial interpretation of similar statutes in other states. It concluded the presumption in Probate Code section 243 subsection (a) does not apply to a judgment on appeal.
The Administrator next argued Peterson's murder conviction constituted sufficient evidence of a felonious and intentional killing for the purposes of Probate Code section 254, subsection (b). This statute provides that, in the absence of a final judgment, the court "may determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the killing was felonious and intentional." The Court agreed that proof of Peterson's non-final conviction for first degree murder was sufficient to discharge the Administrator's burden of proof under this statute. The burden of proof then shifted to Peterson to present evidence that he did not feloniously and intentionally kill his wife.
In considering the evidentiary significance of Peterson's conviction, the Court applied Evidence Code section 1300, which states: "[e]vidence of a final judgment adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable as a felony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in a civil action to prove any fact essential to the judgment. …" The Court noted the phrase "final judgment" was equally ambiguous on its face in this statute as it was in Probate Code section 254 subsection (a). But, unlike the Probate Code, the Court concluded Evidence Code section 1300 was intended to apply to judgments that were final in the trial court (even if the judgment was on appeal). The Court noted four separate indicia supported this holding:
- The statute was adopted from the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and a drafter's comment to these Rules contained "no hint that a judgment on appeal would not qualify;"
- When the Uniform Rules were updated the hearsay exception was amended to provide that "[t]he pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility," demonstrating that the term "final judgment" was intended all along to apply to judgments that are final in the trial court;
- Nothing in the legislative history or comments of Evidence Code section 1300 indicated the words "final judgment adjudging a person guilty" were intended only to apply to judgments that were not subject to pending appeals; and
- Nothing in the development of California law regarding the admissibility of prior felony convictions suggested Evidence Code section 1300 was intended to apply only to felony convictions not subject to pending appeals.
As to the fourth point, the Court noted it had arrived at a contrary conclusion in In re L.S. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 407. However, the Court concluded its reasoning in this past case was "ill-advised" and expressly disapproved it.
Consequently, the evidence of Peterson's first degree murder conviction was sufficient to establish he had feloniously and intentionally killed the insured, absent any evidence to the contrary. Since Peterson presented no contrary evidence, the Court concluded the Administrator had met her burden and, under Probate Code sections 252 and 254, Peterson was not entitled to any benefits under the policy.
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This opinion is not final. Though it has been certified for publication, it may be withdrawn from publication, modified on rehearing, or granted review by the California Supreme Court. Should any of these events occur, the opinion would be unavailable for use as authority in other cases.
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